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WORDS IN THOUGHT 
by 
ZENO VENDLER 
1. Man is a thinking being; more than anything else, this feature sets apart this spe­
cies of hairless apes from the rest of the world's inhabitants. 
It may be argued, however, that we often use the verb to think in describing 
what some of the other higher animals do. "The dog thinks that I am his master", 
"The cat thinks that the mouse is still in the hole", etc. Since there is no reason to 
object that such locutions involve a misuse of the language, and since what we nor­
mally say determines the meaning of our words, the conclusion is inevitable: in 
some sense of the verb, at least, some animals too can think. 
What is that sense and, on the other hand, what are the senses of the word 
which exclusively apply to humans, on the basis of which the definition of man as 
a thinking being still can be maintained? 
The first suspicious feature that meets the eye in the examples just mentioned is 
the following: in these and similar cases what the animal is supposed to think in­
volves an error, or the possibility of error, at least according to the speaker's esti­
mate: I am not the dog's master, and the mouse might not be :in the hole. Thus, it 
seems, this kind of thinking is contrasted with knowing, and, of course, animals can 
know many things. 
We often apply the verb to think to people, too, in the same sense. Somebody is 
about to cross a rickety bridge unconcerned. "He thinks it won't collapse" we say. 
And this may be true, even if the walker pays no attention to the bri'dge, has no 
conscious thoughts about it. Similarly, the prankster who has unscrewed the legs of 
my chair might say, as I am about to sit down: "He thinks it'll support him". The 
point here is precisely the lack of any suspicion or reflection on my part: since I 
have not noticed anything untoward, but go ahead unconcerned, I may be said to 
think that the chair will support me. 
Now could it be said with equal ease in these situations that, for example, the cat 
concluded that the mouse was still in the hole or that the walker assumed that the 
bridge would support him, or that I hoped that the chair would not collapse? Cer­
tainly not, unless there is some reason to think that the cat, as it were,� the evi­
dence, and that the walker and I noticed the weakness of those implements, but 
decided, on the basis of some considerations, to risk it anyway. Notice, however, 
that at this point the similarity between man and beast breaks down: cats, unlike 
people, cannot weigh evidence, consider reasons, make decisions, nurture hopes, 
and so forth. And the reason is simple: these actions and states imply mental events, 
of which their subject is conscious, in other words, they involve having thoughts. 
Indeed, whereas, as we saw, there is no difficulty in saying that the cat, for exam­
ple, thought that the mouse was in the hole, one would not say, without rais1ng 
some eyebrows, that the cat had the thought that the mouse was in the hole, or 
that such a thought has occurred to the cat.1 
What entitles us to say that cats and dogs know many things, or that they think 
this or that in the restricted sense just explained? The observation of what they do, 
is the obvious answer-of their behavior, in a more pompous parlance. For neither 
knowing, nor being mistaken, nor thinking in the corresponding sense, need to in­
volve anything beyond that in either man or beast. 
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But how do we know that man, but not the beast, also has thoughts, that is to 
say, that he iis capable of a kind of activity which is not identical with overt behav· 
ior, and which need not ev·en manifest itself in what he does? "Well, he can tell me 
what he thought, he can reveal in this way what went on in his mind." This, too, is 
an obvious answer, and the correct one at that. For, notice, what he says about his 
thoughts can be true or false, no less than what he says about other things. Thus the 
things which make what he says true or false in the first case are no less "real" than 
the things which make what he says true or false in the second. As one could not lie 
about dogs and cats if there were no dogs and cats, one could not lie about thoughts 
if thoughts did not exist. If Jim says, "I believe that Joe is innocent", then what he 
says can be wrong in two independent ways: either because Joe is guilty, or because 
Jim thinks he is. In the former case he is mistaken, in the second he is lying. 
Thus ther•e is . a kind of thinking which is an exclusive prerogative of human 
beings. For if you say that, maybe, dogs, cats and chimpanzees also have conscious 
thoughts, my answer is that there is no reason to think so, and so long as they are 
unable to tell us what they think, there cannot be such a reason. And when I say 
"tell" I mean tell, i.e. convey to us, with set purpose and by the use of mutually 
comprehensible media, what they want us to come to believe about their thoughts 
as distinct from having those thoughts. And this is a tall order-even for Washoe and 
Co.2 
Thus, to conclude with Descartes, "the word is the sole sign and the only certain 
mark of the presence of thought hidden and wrapped up in the body".3 We know 
that man is a thinking being because he can talk, and tell us what he thinks. 
2. It is important to reflect upon the nature of the inference expressed in the last 
sentence. The because there marks an epistemological link, not a causal one. We 
know that the barn is on fire because of the smoke coming out. This does not mean, 
however, that the smoke causes the fire. In a similar way, although our knowledge 
that man thinks depends upon his ability to talk, it does not follow at all that his 
ability to think presupposes, or is a function of, his ability to talk. In other words, 
even though it is impossible for us to discover that a certain species of living beings 
have thoughts if they cannot talk, it is perfectly conceivable that there may be 
beings that can think without being able to talk. Unless, of course, the very ability 
to think, in the sense of having thoughts presupposes the possession of a language. 
This last relation is often taken for granted by many philosophers, psychologists 
and linguists. Some of them even go as far as to assert that thinking is actually noth­
ing but talking, albeit to oneself, silently. The classic passage making this claim is 
Plato's in Theaetetus: 
Socr. 
Theaet. 
Socr. 
56 
. .. And do you accept my description of the process of think­
ing? 
How do you describe it? 
As a discourse that the mind carries on with itself about any 
subject it is considering. You must take this explanation as 
coming from an ignoramus; but I have a notion that, when the 
mind is thinking, it is simply talking to itself, asking questions 
and answering them... So I should describe thinking as a dis­
course, and judgement as a statement prnnounced, not aloud 
to someone else, but silently to oneself.4 
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Plato, inddentally, is less sanguine about this view ( .. .ignoramus ... ) than some of 
its latter-day sponsors. Gilbert Ryle echoes Plato in saying that "much of our ordin­
ary thinking is conducted in internal monologues or silent soliloquy, usually accom­
panied by an internal cinernatograph-show of visual imagery," and then goes on to 
explain the origin of such an activity as follows: 
This trick of talking to oneself in silence is acquired neither quickly nor 
without effort; and it is a necessary condition of our acquiring it that we 
should have previously learned to talk intelligently aloud and have heard 
and understood other people doing so. Keeping our thoughts to ourselves 
is a sophisticated accomplishment.5 
Speech, we used to think, is the expression of thought. Now Professor Ryle tells 
us that it is rather thought which is the suppression of speech ... And he is by no 
means alone. Wittgenstein, too, wonders about the possibility of deaf-mutes' think­
ing,6 and he says explicitly: "When I think in language, there aren't 'meanings' go­
ing through my mind in addition to the verbal expression: the language is the vehi­
cle of thought."7 It would follow, then, that in this case we think in a natural lan­
guage, English, German or Chinese ... At which point one might wonder in what 
understanding something said in a foreign tongue must be: repeating it in that lan­
guage, translating or paraphrasing it in our own or what? 
The contrary tradition, according to which thought does not presuppose, but is 
expressed in speech, also originates in Greek philosophy. Her,e is a typical expres­
sion of Aristotle's opinion. 
Spoken words are the symbols of mental experience and written words are 
the symbols of spoken word§. Just as all men have not the same writing, so 
all men have not the same speech sounds, but the mental experiences, 
which these directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things 
of which our experiences are the images.8 
The Aristotelian tradition has prevailed in the Middle Ages, and the Rationalists, 
following Descartes, toe the same line. The very influential Port Royal Grammar 
(Grammaire General et Raisonnee) insists that there is no similarity between the de­
vices of language and the thoughts they are used to express.9 
Although there are some indications of reverting to the Platonic tradition in the 
Empiricists' writings (in Hobbes and Berkeley, for instance), its real revival is due to 
the rise of behavioristic tendencies in the last hundred years. Although thought, in 
its very nature, is a private occurrence, by viewing it as "suppressed" speech, one 
does not appear at least to have trespassed too far into the forbidden preserve of 
the mental. 
I shall argue below that the Platonic view, according to which thinking essen­
tially or typically is talking to oneself silently, is mistaken. This conclusion does 
not exclude, however, some weaker claims, of which I mention here two. The first 
one maintains that although the process of thinking is not the same as talking to 
oneself silently, nevertheless it essentially or typically involves the use of words, 
phrases or sentences. The difference between the original Platonic theory and this 
watered down version can be made clear by considering such word-games as Scrab­
ble, cross-word-puzzles, etc.: in playing them one uses words without saying any­
thing. I shall claim that this version too is mistaken: although words may occur in 
thinking, their role is neither essential nor universal. 
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Finally, some contemporary philosophers maintain that the acquisition of a na­
tural language is a necessary condition for having conceptual thoughts. This claim 
is based on the view that having a concept is nothing but knowing how to us,e a cer­
tain word. Again I disagree, but am willing to grant that the development and the 
refinement of our conceptual equipment is indeed greatly influenced by the lan­
guage(s) we leam.10 
3. We have restricted the sense of thinking that concerns us here to conscious 
thought. Our thoughts are some of the things of which we are or can become con· 
scious. We are also conscious of sensations, feelings, emotions, moods, and so forth, 
and, of course, the play of our imaginations. These things, pace Descartes, are not 
thoughts per se. Having a headache is not having a thought-and the man on the 
rack may be unable to think precisely because of the excruciating pain he suffers. 
Similarly, daydreaming. is not thinking, but an escape from it, and the lascivious 
play of St. Anthony's imagination did not add to, but rather interf erred with, his 
holy meditations. 
What, then, are thoughts, and what is thinking? The word thought is normally 
used to denote the object of somebody's mental acts (e.g., what one realizes, con­
cludes, decides, etc.), or mental states (e.g., what one believes, suspects, intends, 
etc.). These two groups differ in an important respect: a mental act occurs in a giv­
en moment, but a mental state lasts for a period of time. "When did you realize 
that �?" and "For how long did you believe that J!?" we ask, and not the other way 
around. Similarly, it makes sense to say of a person that he still intends to do some­
thing, but not that he still decides to do it. In a mental act a thought is formed or 
conceived, in a mental state it is held and entertained. Indeed, we speak of beliefs, 
for instance, as if they were children: we conceiive, nurture and embrace them, hold 
them for a while, and if found misbegotten, abandon them or give them up. More­
over, whereas we are normally conscious of our mental acts, this is not true of our 
mental states. Their objects are ordinarily not in the foreground of our conscious­
ness, yet they remain, as it were, at our beck and call: one can become conscious of 
them at will. Normally, again, people are able to say, when asked, what they believe, 
whom they suspect, and what they intend to do. We use the word thought in these 
senses when we offer "a penny for your thoughts" or when we say that, e.g., the 
Little Red Book contains Chairman Mao's thoughts. 
What one thinks, the thought, is conceived or entertained by the thinker: "Joe 
thinks (i.e. !believes, suspects, etc.) that .Q,11 "Then I thought (i.e. assumed, realized, 
concluded, etc.) that.Q." The verb-object of think in these contexts is a nominalized 
sentence, in most cases a that-clause, which denotes the thought in question. Since 
there is a nearly perfect correspondence between the objects of mental acts and 
states on the one hand, and of speech acts on the other, i.e. between what one can 
think and what one can say, philosophers commonly refer to these common objects, 
usually expressed in that-clauses, as propositions. Thoughts, therefore, that can be 
expressed in speech are aptly called propositional thoughts.11 
The verb to ..think used to attribute such thoughts to a person hardly admits pro­
gressive tens>Cs: I am thinking that p or He was thinking that p are at best substandard 
sentences. There is, however, another context in which that verb is used progres­
sively: What are you thinking about? and Last night I was thinking about your the­
ory for more than an hour, and so forth. In these cases the thinking involved con­
stitutes an activity that goes on in time, and can be pursued at will. Notice, the 
question What are you doing? may be answered by I am thinking about Angola but 
not by I think that we .should not get involved in Angola. Similarly, whereas one 
might say of a man sound asleep that he thinks that Angola is not worth the effort, 
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one could not say of him, while still asleep, that he is thinking about that place. 
Nevertheless the notion of thinking about involves the notion of thinking that. 
In order to show this relation, I propose to consider a related couple of concepts, 
namely talking about something and saying something. Quite obviously, talking a­
bout something is a process that goes on in time, an activity in which a person may 
be engaged for a while. Now what does a person do when he is. talking about a cer­
tain topic? Well, he says a few things about it. I cannot be talking about Angola, or 
anything else, without performing such speech acts as stating and suggesting, argu­
ing and concluding, guessing and predicting, accusing, blaming, condemning, and so 
forth. And what about thinking about Angola? The situation is analogous. I cannot 
be engaged in thinking about it without entertaining some thoughts (mainly of t!le 
propositional sort) about Angola and related matters. I may recall the facts, look 
for implications, realize connections, consider some possibilities, wonder about the 
consequences, decide to read more about the background, and so on. It would be 
rather peculiar indeed, if I were to assert that I was just thinking about Angola, and 
yet, when asked what I thought about it, could not answer a thing. Plato was right 
part of the way: thinking is like talking, reasoning is like arguing; they show a simi­
larity of structure. This, however, does not require identity. A word expressed in 
Morse code retains some of its structure; yet saying a word does not consist in ut­
tering dots and dashes. What we think is normally expressed in words and sentences; 
but it does not follow that we think in words and sentences. 
I do not claim that all thought is propositional. The painter may think intensely 
while staring at his canvas, the composer while running his fingers over the key­
board, the chess-player while imagining the board two moves ahead. They "see" 
lines, "hear" music, envisage a new setup, without being able to articulate in words, 
even if they wanted to, what exactly they thought. But this kind of thinking seems 
to be the exception rather than the rule. For otherwise the Platonic temptation to 
view thought in general as an inner monologue would not have the lure it generally 
has. 
Having made the necessary distinctions and qualifications, my first task is to 
show that thinking in the propositional sense cannot consist in saying something 
internally, and consequently that thinking about something cannot be conceived of 
in terms of talking to oneself silently. 
4. Saying something is a spiecifically human act (actus humanus, not merely actus 
hominis), and as such, is subject to the will. This philosophical claim means that 
the agent performing a speech act must be aware of what he is doing and must in­
tend to do it. This is not the case with all the actions a man can do. We are not a­
ware of our digesting of food, and we do not intend our heartbeat. Such actions, 
in fact, are never subject to the will. Some others,. such as kicking somebody or 
breaking the window may or may not be. That they often are is shown by the fact 
that, first, they can be performed intentionally, deliberately,. on purpose, and so 
forth; second, that the agent � have reasons for performing tlhem; and third, that 
he may be held responsible for having performed them. There are, finally, kinds of 
actions that by their very nature must be voluntary, i.e. subject to the will: e.g. rob­
bing the bank, murdering the guard, and so forth. One can break the window, but 
not rob the bank accidentally; one can kill, but not murder somebody, unintention­
ally. Then it is clear that saying something belongs to this last category: one cannot 
state, promise or order something, wam,accuse or condemn somebody uninten­
tionally either: the speaker must know what.he is saying and must intend to say it. 
This claim is not refuted by the fact that often the speaker does not "fully" 
know what he is saying, or intend all the implications. Granted, one may betray a 
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secret unwittingly, or identify somebody unintentionally (say, by addressing him, 
using his true name, in front of the detective), but even in these cases the speaker 
does intent to perform some speech-act.or other: the "traitor" may just want t.o mrure an 
innocent remark, and the "identifier" just offer a friendly greeting. Such "double 
effects" are by no means peculiar to speech-situations. The child, by eating the can­
dy, may poison himself, and the soldier, by opening the door, may set off the 
booby-trap. They intend the one thing, not the other. 
If, therefore, thinking were talking to oneself, albeit silently, then it would fol­
low that all thoughts were intentional, i.e. subject to the will, since, according to 
the theory, conceiving a thought is saying something, albeit to oneself. And this is 
clearly false. It is false not only because of the obvious fact that thoughts often 
emerge ("crop up", "strike us" or "dawn upon us") unasked for, and often keep 
bothering us to the point of obsession, but because of a deeper and more general 
reason. 
In saying that a certain act (e.g. smashing the window) was done intentionally, 
we do not merely mean that the agent knew what he was doing, but also that he 
could have done otherwise (if he wanted to). Now, whereas it is certainly true that 
in thinking what I think I am aware of wl)at I think, more often than not it is non­
sensical to say that I could do otherwise (if I wanted to). Granted, there are certain 
forms of thought, such as decisions, assumptions and the like, that are indeed sub­
ject to the will, i.e. the agent is free to assume, or decide to do, something or other. 
There are, however, other forms of thought which by their very nature preclude 
such freedom. Think of noticing a similarity, realizing a connection, understanding 
a problem, discovering a solution, seeing an implication, recognizing a friend , and 
so forth. In what sense can these acts be intentional, free, or subject to the will? 
Does it make sense to say: "I suddenly saw the solution 0if the puzzle, but I 
could have done otherwise" or ''Then I decided to realize the connection between 
the two aspects"? How unlike it is with saying: there is nothing wrong with such 
assertions as "I told him the solution but I could have done otherwise " and "llten 
I decided to state the connection between the two aspects". 
Consequently, if the Platonic theory were true, then it would follow that in 
thinking we "say" things to ourselves involuntarily, unintentionally, in such a way 
that is, that we could not do otherwise. Moreover, as the previous argument about 
"unwelcome" thoughts shows, very often, as it were, we could not shut up to our­
selves ... We know, of course, that some people are "compulsive" talkers, cannot in­
deed shut up. But this is a pathological condition, compulsive behavior, or simply 
lack of self-control. No such explanation is applicable to normal thinkers. 
To sum up: talking, saying things, are voluntary actions. Having certain common 
types of thoughts cannot be voluntary. Consequently thinking in general cannot be 
talking to oneself silently or aloud. 
5. I just said that the speaker must intend what he is doing, must "mean" what he 
says. What does such an intention actually consist of? Well, it depends on the type 
of speech act he performs. In stating for instance that he was, born in Ashtabula, 
Ohio, the speaker normally intends his audience to believe, through the recognition 
of his intention in saying those words, that he was born in Ashtabula, Ohio; in .Q!­
dering someone to leave the room, he normally intends (via the same kind of recog­
nition) the hearer to leave the room; in promising something he intends (in the same 
way) to put himself under a specific obligation; and so forth.13 In other words, he 
intends to be understood, not merely as to the content of his utterance, but also as 
to its illocutionary force.14 
In the light of this, consider mental acts against the background of the Platonic 
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hypothesis, namely, that thinking is talking to oneself silently, and having a thought 
is saying something to oneself. Quite obviously the result is absurd, and in this case, 
absurd with respect to any kind of mental act. For, to begin with the first aspect, 
how can I intend to be understood by myself in saying something to myself, when 
the very act of saying something presupposes that I understand what I am saying? 
Or, if I do not understand what I am saying, then what is the point of saying it t.o my­
self? 
The second aspect leads to an equal absurdity. Consider such mental acts as com­
ing to suspect, or coming to realize, something or other. If, for instance, my realiza­
tion that J! is the case consisted in my saying to myself that J!, then I could not pos­
sibly intend myself to come to believe that .E as a result of saying to myse If that .e, 
since in saying that J! I would already have realized that ..Q_. To put it simply: what is 
the point of telling myself something which I know to be the case in the very act of 
telling? Or, to make it worse, what is the point of telling myself something which I 
have to know (if I am sincere) to be able to tell at all? 
Then consider a mental act of another kind, a decision for instance. I just decid­
ed to go to Paris next summer. What did I say to myself? "I'll go to Paris"? But 
then, what makes this inner speech-act into the carrier of a decision rather than of 
a simple forecast, guess, or-to make it worse again-rather than its being just a sen­
tence mtntally rehearsed? "Well, you must intend it as a decision". But how can I 
accomplish that in talking to myself? By saying, perhaps, "I decide to go to Paris" . . .  
This won't do.,  however, since this sentence is ungrammatical: except for the con­
text of reporting a habit (e.g. "I usually decide to ... "), the verb-phrase decide to 
cannot be used in the first person singular/present tense. I can tell you what I decid­
ed to do, but the very grammar of the verb prevents me from making a decision by 
its use. For the same reason, such verbs as realize, find out, discover, and so forth, 
which are used to report the occurrence of some mental acts, cannot be emp1loyed 
in the very performance of those acts. It appears, therefore, that one cannot specify 
the form of one's thoughts by using verbal means. On the contrary, the principal 
means of marking the form of one's speech-acts is the use of the appropriate "per­
formative" verbs (e.g. �. predict, promise, order, apologize, etc.). This asym­
metry alone is sufficient to show that thinking cannot be conceived of as talking to 
oneself silently. 
6. Thus far we have considered the Platonic hypothesis in its full-blooded version, 
according to which having a thought consists in saying something to oneself in the 
strong sense of the word, i.e., in performing a speech-act. The following arguments 
will demonstrate that even the watered-down version of the theory, which claims 
that at least the use of words is essential to propositional thought, is also unten­
able. 
The freedom we enjoy in speech is not restricted to the mere option of talk ver­
sus silence. Even if we have decided to say something, further choices await us be· 
fore we open our mouths: we have to decide, consciously or by mere routine, how 
to say what we have to say, i.e., in what language, style, manner, etc. We talk differ­
ently to adults and children, in the classroom, court of law, pub, or one's own 
home. In all of these cases one takes into consideration the audience's knowledge, 
standing, circumstances, presuppositions, and what not. For these reasons people 
often are not satisfied by merely being told what somebody has said, but they also 
want to know the exact words the speaker used. Accordingly, we have two distinct 
devices to reproduce what people said, namely the indirect and the direct quota­
tion. I might say, for instance "All right, you told me that he had asked you to 
leave the premises, but I want to know what exactly did he say word by word." 
And such a request makes sense with respect to any kind of.speech-act. 
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Now compare this situation with such mental acts as realizations, recognitions, 
decisions and regrets. Suppose I tell you that last night I suddenly realized that it 
must have been Jones, the janitor, who opened my letters in the office. Would it 
make sense for you to ask for the exact words of my realizing this? And would it be 
possible for me to answer? Which of the following sentences "crossed my mind" in 
the act: "He must have done it'', "It was done by Jones", "The janitor did it", or 
what? Well, ·suppose I indeed "said to myself" (perhaps even aloud) "It was him". 
What makes this into a realization, and the realization of that particular thing? Sure­
ly it is not enough if that sentence merely crossed my mind. "No, you must have 
meant it" you say. But this would make it into an intentional act, which a realiza­
tion is not. Then, perhaps, it was as if I heard somebody telling me "It was him". 
We indeed say things like "a little voice told me ... ". But this would be the descrip­
tion of a hunch rather than of a realization, For one thing, did I believe the "little 
voice?" We feel that we are, once more, in the domain of the absurd-or the meta­
phorical. 
I do not deny, of course, that that sentence, or some other, may have cropped 
up in my imagination, or may even have been (subvocally or vocally) articulated by 
me, in making that realization. I may have said to myself "But of course!" or "How 
stupid of me not to have thought of that!" or what have you. Most of us, indeed, 
"think aloud" in unguarded moments, or even gesticulate and make faces. We must 
not forget that words are the natural means of expressing thoughts, so it is no won­
der that thoughts and words are so closely associated that the occurrence of the for­
mer tends to evoke the latter. Some people cannot hum without beating the rhythm 
with hand or foot. So, maybe, some people cannot think without words crossing 
their minds. Nevertheless humming is not beating, and thinking is not imagining, or 
producing words, gestures and the like. 
The same thing applies, incidentally, to imagination in general, to Ryle's "cine­
matograph-show": images, too, may accompany thinking. In thinking about the 
law, one may visualize dusty tomes, or a court-room; in thinking about a mathemat­
ical problerp one may see beads, or numerals on the blackboard. This does not 
mean, however, that such imaginings are essential to thinking about these things. 
7. Suppose that my realization that it was the janitor who had opened my letters, 
was indeed couched in the words "He must have done it". Then the problem arises, 
how come that the word he .(mentally pronounced or heard) meant the janitor. In 
normal speec!h we select referring devices (names, pronouns, definite descriptions, 
together with accompanying gestures, etc.) which, given the physical setup of the 
situation and the course of the preceding conversation, enable the audience to un­
derstand whom we have in mind. In doing so, moreover, the speaker has to keep 
the particular audience in mind: one would not rely on pointing, for instance, in 
talking to a blind man, or the use of a nickname in front of an audience which is 
not supposed to be familar with it. The encoding of the reference, therefore, is suit­
able or not given those circumstances and that a.udience. And this, of course, is the 
source of possible mistakes: the speaker may misjudge the situation, the hearer's 
position, knowledge, condition, etc. Correspondingly, even an objectively adequate 
referen.ce may misfire due to inattention, mishearing, or mistaken assumptions on 
the part of the audience; that is to say, mistakes can occur on the "decoding" end 
too. This feature, i.e. the possibility of mistakes on both ends, are characteristic and 
essential to any use of a communicating device. 
Yet no such mistakes ar,e possible in thought, in the alleged "silent conversation 
with myself". Who is the audience I have to consider in picking the suitable med­
ium? Myself, of course. Is there, then, any possilbility of selecting a word, a phrase, 
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an image, or what have you, which might be opaque, incomprehensible or mislead­
ing to me? Or, on the receiving end, can I fail to gather the identity of the thing or 
person I am thinking about from the media thus provided? Of course not. But then 
there are no media and no reference. What on earth, indeed, would be the point of 
encoding a message to myself, to be decoded-instantly and infallibly, mind you­
by myself again? 
Thus whereas in talking ;ibout the janitor I may have to use such phrases as he, 
that man, Jones or the janitor in order to make you understand whom I havein 
mind, in thinking about him I do not need any (subvocal) words, (imagined) ges­
tures or what not, to determine, for myself, whom I have in mind. For, let it be the 
case that in making that realization I indeed said to myself "He must have done it", 
silently, or even aloud. Then, if you like, the he referred to that man. But why? Be­
cause I had him in mind in saying that and for no other reason. But then my having 
him in mind cannot possibly consist in using he or any other phrase. It makes sense 
to say that I talked about that man in terms of his being the janitor, also that I re· 
ferred to him by the words the janitor; it also makes sense to say that I thought a­
bout him in terms of his being the janitor-but it is nonsense to say that in my 
thought I referred to him by the words the janitor.15 
8. A similar contrast between speech and thought arises in connection with ambig­
uous sentences, whether or not the ambiguity is due to semantic or syntactic fac­
tors. If I tell you that I am going to the bank, you will understand 'what I said 
this way ( ... money ... ) or that ( ... river ... ) from the circumstances-if you can decide 
at all. As to myself, I may "mean" it one way or the other. Now what does it mean 
to "mean" it, or understand it, in one particular way? Well, as to the first, it de­
pends on what I intend you to come to believe, and-if I am honest-on what I real­
ly intend to do: going to the First National or going to the riverbank. As to the sec­
ond, it depends UPQn what you take my words to mean, and-if you think I am tell· 
ing the truth-on what you come to think about my intentions. Now is it in the 
least believable that these mental acts (i.e. my decision to go to the river, my inten­
tion to tell you the truth, or to lie, your understanding of what I said, or your 
doubts about its truth, and so forth) are all cast in unambiguous sentences? In sen­
tences that is, in which the· work Q!n.! is replaced, or is accompanied by, an unam­
biguous paraphrase? 
Syntactical ambiguities raise the same problems. Think, for instance, of the men­
tal flip.flop involved in the understanding of Mary had a little lamb-and Jane a 
little pork. Now how come that my thought that Mary had (i.e. ate) a little lamb is 
not ambiguous? Or can one say "I thought 'Mary had a little lamb' and I meant it 
in the sense of eating?" 
Then there are metaphors, allusions, ironic remarks, and so .forth. "It was a very 
nice thing to do" I tell you, meaning that it was an awful thing to do. Is it possible 
to think that it was an awful thing to do in saying to oneself "It was a very nice 
thing to do''? "He must have hit the ceiling, I think." Can I ever be in doubt about 
what I just thought in this case? Yet the sentence He must have hit the ceiling is am­
biguous. 
To sum up. The use of language involves all sorts of ambiguities. It is up to the 
speaker, therefore, to prevent, and up to the listener, to avoid, misunderstandings 
due to this source. In doing this both participants have to rely on the circumstances. 
Now if thought consisted in the use of language, then, first, there could be, and of­
ten would be, ambiguous thoughts (in the relevant sense of ambiguity), second, the 
thinker would frequently face the task of disambiguating (i.e. finding the correct 
"reading" for) his thoughts and, third, he would have to rely on circumstantial clues 
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in doing so. I submit that all these consequences are absurd. 
9. People are not infallible, commit errors in many things they do, and speech is no 
exception. They make mistakes of grammar, use the wrong word, commit malaprop­
isms and various slips of the tongue. Thus it often happens that they do not in fact 
say what they wanted to say, or even what they think they are saying. Of course 
both the· audience and the speaker may detect such errors, and then the speaker 
may come to correct himself. The audience, too, is liable to errors of its own One 
may mishear the speaker, misunderstand him, and so forth. Errors can occur on 
both ends of the speaker-hearer relation. 
This possibility casts a new pall on the Platonic theory, whether it be conceived 
actively, as talking to oneself, or passively, as hearing "voices" in the imagination. 
For, to take the first alternative, it would allow situations in which the speaker 
could be mistaken about what he actually thought. He might say things like "I 
thought I thought that p, but then I realized that in fact I thought that _g, so I 
corrected myself' or "I wanted to think that B but in fact I thought that g_" and so 
forth. I forego the pleasure of pointing out the absurdities in such reports. 
The second alternative, the passive one, fares no better. It leads to the possibility 
of misunderstanding, or failing to understand, one's own thoughts. "I am not sure 
what I thought-the thinker could report-it may be understood as .I!. or as g:-as if 
trying to interpret an oracle. 
10. Finally, having given the main arguments showing the implausibility, and the 
falsity, of the Platonic view, I sketch a few additional considerations to reinforce 
this conclusion. 
Although we often ask the foreigner "In what language do you think?" we do 
not take this question so seriously as to countenance such answers as "I think in 
English now, but in bad English. I misuse words in my thoughts, I commit grammat­
ical errors, and so forth. Moreover, owing to this handicap, I think rather slowly and 
in primitive sentences". I suppose "thinking in English" means nothing more than 
having the facility of expressing oneself in English directly without first formulating 
what one wimts to say in another language, and then translating by means of some 
set procedure. 
Very often we hear "I do not find the exact word for what I want to say". The 
most natural :assumption is that the speaker does know what he wants to say. For 
after a 'while he might exclai� "I have it! It is ... ". The word fits. Fits what? Fits in­
to the sentence(s) the thinker entertains? Hardly, since many words could do that. 
But that word alone expresses his thought. 
Similarly, in giving paraphrases or translations for a given sentence one does not 
normally operate on a word-to-word basis. One gets the "sense" of the sentence, 
and then looks for another sentence (in the same language or another) that express­
es the same sense. Now this sense is surely not grasped in terms of another sentence, 
since that is exactly what one hopes to find. Nor does one, like the foreignerwho 
does not "think" in English yet, follow any set of rules-connecting words to 
words-in performing the task. Translating is not like projeclting another picture 
from a given picture by some rote; it is rather like drawing another picture, in an· 
other medium, of the thing the first picture depicts. 
11. Let us recall the kind of thinking chess-players, painters, composers, and for 
that matter, plumbers, repairmen, and so forth, are likely to be doing in performing 
their respective tasks. Their thinking, no doubt, is accompanied by a great deal of 
imagination representing colors, shapes, sounds, and various objects in a variety of 
configurations. Now compare these activities with the performance of such "ver­
bal" tasks as writing a poem or a speech, playing Scrabble, solving cross-word puz-
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des, translating, doing research in linguistics, and so on. Each of these activities in­
volves thinking, often on a very high level. Yet, obviously, no less than in the pre­
vious cases, the help of the imagination is needed in the thinking process. The dif· 
ference is that in these situations the imagination is enlisted to evoke not colors and 
sounds, chess-pieces or pipes, but words, phrases and sentences. 
Then consider people who are natively blind, or deaf. Quite obviously their han­
dicap will restrict the power of their imagination: the blind man will be unable to 
imagine colors., the deaf sounds. Moreover, unless specially trained, the deaf man 
will remain mute, consequently no words at all will occur in the play of his imagina­
tion. There is no reason to think, however, that such people cannot think about 
matters that do not require the kind of imagination they happen to lack. The blind 
person will not be able to think about color-harmonies, and the deaf-mute will not 
be able to compose music or write poetry, at least not until their handicap is com­
pensated for in one way or another. 
The deaf-mute, of course, unlike the blind, als:o suffers the disadvantage of being 
unable to expr,ess the thoughts he has by the normal means, i.e., by the use of lan­
guage. But here, again, the break between him and normal people is not so sharp.as 
some philosophers want us to believe. There are many thoughts we are unabl1e to ex­
press, either because the language itself fails to provide the facilities, or because our 
own command of the language is insufficient. As to the first ]point, I remind you, 
once more, of the kind of thinking done by composers, painters, and, often enough 
it seems, even by mathematicians and physicists; not to speak of the experiences 
and insights mystics claim to have. As to the second, think of inarticulate people 
(who may be very smart otherwise) or yourself in a foreign country. You want to 
say something very badly, and cannot. They you try to say it in your native 
tongue-and fail again, because of disuse and confusion. 
At the beginning we remarked that there are certain forms of thought which we 
are unwilling to attribute to dumb beasts because these forms presuppose having 
conscious thoUJghts in the agent. Since, moreover, thinking about something con­
sists of having a series of such thoughts, we are equally reluctant to say that a cer­
tain dog or cat is at present engaged in thinking about something or other. 
Now what about the deaf-mute? Are we equally unwilling. to say that often he 
wonders and guesses, assumes and concludes, deliberates and decides, pretends and 
hopes? Is it impossible for him to form beliefs, nurture suspicions, find out that he 
was wrong, change his mind about the matter, and so forth? And, accordingly , 
should we say that he is inherently incapable of thinking about something or other 
for a while? I do not see any reason to think so, since although such a person can­
not talk, we can communicate with him to some extent at least, via gestures, facial 
expressions, and pantomine, no less than with a person whose language � utterly 
unknown to us. I do not think that I would find a difference in kind between the 
difficulty of communicating with a monolingual Tibetan and the difficulty of com­
municating with a deaf-mute . One can even mistake a weird-sounding langUJage for 
the mutterings of a deaf-mute, and vice-versa, at least for a while. Yet, given the 
hypothesis that the Tibetan can think (since he can talk) and the deaf-mute cannot 
(since he cannot talk), the difference should be categorical. For one cannot really 
communicate with an unthinking being: communication with somebody consists in 
getting him to understand what I think and what I want, and in coming to 
understand what he thinks and wants, quite apart from appropriate overt 
performance, i.f any. Thus, as I said at the beginning, one cannot communicate 
with a beast, but one can with a foreigner and with a deaf-mute equally. For they, 
both have, as St. Augustine puts it, "the natural language of all peoples" at their 
disposal, to wit, "the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of 
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other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of 
mind . . .  "16 It is easy to imagine flattering or embarrassing a senorita wordlessly­
and whether or not she is a deaf-mute makes no difference. Then think of flattering 
(or embarrassing) a dog ... Thought, real conscious thought, is required to the uptake 
of flattery or to embarrassment. 
If so, then the Platonic account must be wrong. Language is the means of ex­
pressing thoughts, not of having them. 
66 
13
Vendler: Words in Thought
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 1976
Footnotes 
L This distinction has been made clear to me by Professor Norman Malcolm. See 
his Presidential Address entitled "Thoughtless Brute:;," American Philosoph­
ical Association, 1972, pp. 5-20. 
2. Gardner, R.A. and Beatrice T. Gardner, "Teaching Sign Language to a Chim-
panzee," Science, 1969, pp. 165, 664-672. 
3.  Descartes, R. Letter (to Marus), February, 1649: AT V, 278; Descartes Selec­
tions (ed. R.M. Eaton), Scribner, 1927, p. 360. 
4. 189e-190a. It is repeated with some changes in Sophist 263e-264a. I shall call 
the view expressed in these passages "the Platonic theory" without making 
any historical claims about Plato's "real" theory of thinking. 
5. The Concept of Mind, Barnes and Noble, 1949, p. 27. Again I do not claim that 
these passages represent Professor Ryle's final word on thinking: 
6. Philosophical Investigations, Blackwell, 1953, Part I. no. 342 
7. Ibid., no. 329 
8. De Interpretatione 16a. 
9. P. 27 
10. See my Res Cogitans, Cornell U.P., 1972, Chapt,er VI. 
11. Ibid., Chapters II-IV. 
12. For the original idea behind this argument I am indebted to Mr. Tom Dimas. 
13. Here I fallow H.P. Grice's theory of meaning. See his "Meaning," Philosophical 
Review, LXVI (1957), pp. 377-388. 
14. See J.L. Austin, How to Do Things With Words, Clarendon, 1962. 
15. See my "Thinking of Individuals" forthcoming in Nous, 1976. 
16. Confessions, 1.8. 
67 
14
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 7 [1976], No. 1, Art. 2
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol7/iss1/2
